Increasing Importance of Private Enforcement in Europe
The importance of antitrust law is acknowledged all over the world.
However, different conclusions have been drawn as regards the
instruments of its enforcement. As far as damage claims are concerned,
private plaintiffs have played a paramount role in the development of
antitrust law in the United States over the last century. Today, 95 %
of all US antitrust cases are initiated by private parties. In sharp
contrast, private antitrust enforcement in the European Union has
become practically relevant only recently.
In Europe, the enforcement of
damage claims against members of hardcore cartels is still a new
phenomenon.
-
Lack of
practical relevance in the past
-
Paradigm
shift
-
Milestones in the
development of European private antitrust enforcement
-
Where
are we now?
Lack
of practical relevance in the past
Private enforcement of antitrust law has
never been deemed unimportant
in Europe. The German government, for example, already stated in its
1952 Comment on the Draft Act against Restraints of Competition that
the cartel prohibition shall be enforced,
inter alia, by
claims for damages. Similarly, the European Commission noted, in its
1993 Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission
in applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty [OJ C 39/6,
13/02/1993], that such claims should be brought before the courts, as
companies most likely would avoid infringements of EU
competition rules if the infringers face the risk of having to
compensate the victims.
However, said attempts to integrate national courts in the enforcement
of competition law had only moderate success. According to a
comparative study in 2004 (‘
Ashurst Report’),
which was initiated by the Commission, private damage actions for
infringement of competition law have had a marginal relevance thus far.
The Ashurst Report reveals that in all Member States there were only
about 60 reported cases of damage actions based on European or national
competition law between 1962 and 2004. In addition, compensation on the
basis of European competition law was only awarded in 12 cases. The
Ashurst Report concluded that the overall picture that emerges from the
enforcement of damage claims in Europe was that of ‘
astonishing
diversity’ and ‘
total
underdevelopment’.
Paradigm shift
The findings of the Ashurst Report are the result of the legal systems
of the Member States hampering the effective enforcement of civil law
sanctions. It has taken some time for the Commission and national
legislators to acknowledge that
private
and public enforcement of antitrust law complement each other.
Private enforcement not only allows for individual damage claims in the
pursuit of justice and reverses a situation of unjust enrichment, but
it also strengthens the deterrent effect of antitrust rules on
potential infringers, relieves cartel authorities with limited
resources, contributes to development of the law, serves as an
indicator for competition authorities for sensitive issues, and raises
awareness for competition rules and compliance among all market
participants. Accepting this, a fundamental shift in European
competition law and policy has started towards the
strengthening of private
enforcement at European and national level.
Milestones
in the development of European private antitrust enforcement
On the European level, a number of important steps have been taken over
the last decade to strengthen the legal framework of private
enforcement of antitrust law. The following elements might be regarded
as the most important:
18/07/1996
Notice of the European Commission on the
non-imposition or reduction of fines in cartel cases [OJ C 207/4]
With the ‘Leniency Notice’ in 1996 and its
amendments in 2002 and 2006, the Commission has taken an important step
towards a more efficient fight against hardcore cartels. The
Commission’s leniency programme privileges cartel members who
reveal the existence of hardcore cartels and cooperate with the
Commission in its investigation by relieving such cartel members fully
or partly of fines. Private plaintiffs in damages actions may therefore
indirectly benefit from the public leniency programmes, as they promote
the detection of secret cartels. A number of Member States have also
introduced leniency programmes at national level. The idea of leniency
in exchange for the provision of relevant information may also be
applied in the private enforcement of antitrust law. CDC
has developed a similar concept for the benefit of individual cartel
members (see
Leniency PLUS+).
20/09/2001 Court of Justice, Case C-453/99, Courage v
Crehan [2001] ECR I-6297
In this landmark decision the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the full
effectiveness of the cartel prohibition under the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) requires an
individual right to compensation for anybody who sustained damages as a
result of an infringement of such prohibition. The Court of Justice points out that
‘
the existence of such a right strengthens the working of the
Community competition rules and discourages agreements or practices,
which are frequently covert, which are liable to restrict or distort
competition. From that point of view, actions for damages before the
national courts can make a significant contribution to the maintenance
of effective competition in the Community’.
04/01/2003 Council Regulation (EC) No
1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [OJ L 1/1]
The ‘Modernisation Regulation’ resulted in a fundamental
change in the enforcement of EU competition law from an
centralised administrative control by the Commission to a more
decentralised and also private enforcement of the law by third parties
on the basis of economic incentives. In particular, national courts
were given the power, and the obligation, to directly apply Article 101
TFEU. In this respect, Recital 7 of the Regulation
stresses that ‘[n]
ational courts have an essential part to
play in applying the Community competition rules. When deciding
disputes between private individuals, they protect the subjective
rights under Community law, for example by awarding damages to the
victims of infringements’.
31/08/2004 Ashurst Report on behalf of
the European Commission
The Ashurst Report is a study carried out by the law firm Ashurst for
the Commission to identify and analyse the obstacles to successful
damages actions for breach of competition law within the EU. The
Ashurst Report consists of a detailed comparative study, an analysis of
the economic models for the calculation of damages, and national
reports on the state of private antitrust enforcement in each of the
Member States.
19/12/2005 Green Paper of the European
Commission on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules
[COM(2005) 672]
With the objective of tackling the obstacles to private antitrust
enforcement as identified in the Ashurst Report, the Commission
stimulated the debate in this respect by issuing a so-called Green
Paper. The document listed a number of possible options to
further strengthen damage actions before national courts and invited
all stakeholders to comment on such options within several months. All
comments are published.
13/07/2006 Court of Justice, Joined Cases C-295/04 to
C-298/04, Manfredi [2006] ECR I-6619
In this second landmark judgment, the Court of Justice points out that the full
effectiveness of the cartel prohibition under Article 101(1) TFEU would be put at risk if it were not possible
for ‘
any individual’ to claim damages for losses
(including loss of profit and interest as from the day the damage
occurred) caused to him by anticompetitive practices. In addition, the
Court of Justice confirms an obligation of the Member States under EU law to provide
practicable and effective rules and procedures for the enforcement of
damage claims based on cartel activity.
02/04/2008 White Paper of the European
Commission on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules
[COM(2008) 165 final]
In its White Paper on damage actions the European Commission made
concrete proposals to make damage claims by cartel victims more
efficient in practice. The proposals are considered to respect the
traditions and the culture of the European legal systems. The
Commission takes account of the
acquis communautaire, in particular the
valid principles and rules already formulated by the Court of Justice with regard to
the enforcement of antitrust damage claims. It thus acknowledges that
the individual right to compensation finds its legal basis directly in
EU law and that any victim is entitled to full compensation of the
damage sustained.
Key proposals of the Commission concern the possibility of collective
redress, the disclosure of evidence and the binding effect of final
decisions of competition authorities in subsequent damages actions. The
White Paper is accompanied by a Commission Staff Working Paper which
summarises the
acquis communautaire and an Impact Assessment Report
which summarises the findings of a related external study
(‘Impact Study’) that was jointly prepared by the
Centre for European Policies Studies, the
Erasmus University Rotterdam
and the
Libera Università Internazionale degli Studi Sociali
Guido Carli, Rome.
26/03/2009 Resolution of the European
Parliament on the White Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC
antitrust rules [2008/2154(INI)]
The European Parliament’s resolution as well as the related
opinion of the European and Social Committee widely backed the
proposals made in the White Paper. The resolution mainly focuses on
effective redress mechanisms and advocates a balanced approach between
new, innovative forms of litigation and the potential risk of abuses.
Further Developments
Following the resolution of the European Parliament, the Commission has
prepared a draft directive on damage actions for infringement of the EU
competition rules. However, due to concerns of some Member States and
general policy reasons the draft directive has not yet been published.
Competition Commissioner
Kroes recently declared that the finalising
and presentation of the draft directive is left for the new
Commissioner
Almunia.
In parallel to the developments on the EU level as regards antitrust
damage claims there have been fundamental reforms in the legal orders
of several Member States. Numerous damage actions in national courts
all over Europe have also been lodged (for example, cases
Vitamins,
German Cement Cartel and
Hydrogen Peroxide in Germany; cases
Vitamins,
Tyre Rubber and
Air Freight in England; case
Lifts and Escalators in
Belgium and Austria, and case
Sugar in Spain).
Where are
we now?
The developments described have without doubt improved the
possibilities for a private enforcement of antitrust law in Europe.
However, the current situation is still far from satisfactory. A truly
effective framework for enforcing damage claims by any victim of
anticompetitive practices does not yet exist.
This is why
a specific approach like the CDC model is still needed to overcome the existing obstacles to private enforcement.
Printer friendly version of this page 
CDC · Avenue Louise 475 · B-1050 Brussels · Tel: +32 (0) 2 213 49 20