The qualified assessment and preparation of antitrust cases involves significant efforts regarding financial and human resources. These preliminary costs are often too high for single companies. If claims have to be enforced by legal action, court and lawyers fees must be added. Significant cost risks have to be taken into account if  an action should be dismissed (fully or predominantly), costs of the defendant and additional procedural costs have to be borne by the claimant, e.g. because of the involvement of external experts in the lawsuit.

In many cases the model of claims bundling as practiced by CDC opens up economies of scale. In the case of a higher value reached by claims bundling, proportionate unit costs of claims enforcement are significantly reduced accordingly. However, although the model of claims bundling as practiced by CDC ensures that resources are being handled reasonably, costs and cost risks of a damage action remain very high (for options of minimising the cost risks, see our comment on the strategic choice of the legal venue).

Since its establishment, CDC has developed funding models without cost contributions from the cartel victims: CDC uses the gross margin remaining between the purchase price of the damage claims and the realised damage claim for external financing. The changing awareness with regard to the development and the perspectives of private antitrust enforcement, combined with the high potential of added value attracts potential investors. Professional litigation funders as well as private and institutional investors therefore cooperate with CDC.

CDC offers various investment possibilities to third party investors, e.g. direct or indirect private equity contributions. Another interesting investment can be made under CDC's Leniency PLUS⁺-concept.

Besides these cartel-specific investments, CDC currently develops a model for the securitisation of claims in cooperation with external partners. Securitised damage claims allow for specific investment in one of CDC's different fields of activity.

In addition to the fix purchase price for claims assigned, CDC will be mostly able to agree on a variable part of the purchase price amounting up to 75% of the realised damage claims, in exceptional cases up to 80%. All costs and financial risks are solely borne by CDC.

Apart from the internal efforts to be made by the companies, e.g. assisting in the documentation of possible cartel related supply processes, regularly, no additional costs will have to be borne by the cooperating companies. Potential procedural risks are outsourced. In so far, companies affected by a cartel can only win if CDC acts successfully.

Even if damaged companies receive "only" 75 % to 80 % of the ultimate indemnification claimed by CDC, cartel victims of any company size consider the CDC-model to be the only existing alternative at present. Besides significantly improved chances of success, rules under commercial law are another important reason for a cooperation, e.g. because of mandatory provisions in the financial statements for risks of pending lawsuits in case of an action on one's own account.

Cartel damage claims will eventually become marketable assets when institutional investors perceive damage claims as attractive investment. This development already started. Interest yield of cartel damage claims is attractive and guaranteed by law. It encompasses the whole period of the infringement until a binding judgement is reached. The comprehensible interest of cartel victims to generate cashflow as quickly as possible corresponds to the interest of investors in anti-cyclical and profitable investments. The market for damage claims will act as a catalyst of private enforcement of competition law in Europe and will increase both volume and number of enforced claims significantly.